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Abstract: Philosophers and social scientists of diverse orientations have sug-
gested that the pragmatics of semiosis is germane to a dynamic account of
meaning as process. Semiosis, the central focus of C. S. Peirce’s pragmatic
philosophy, may hold a key to perennial problems regarding meaning. Indeed,
Peirce’s thought should be deemed seminal when placed within the cognitive
sciences, especially with respect to his concept of the sign. According to
Peirce’s pragmatic model, semiosis is a triadic, time-bound, context-sensitive,
interpreter-dependent, materially extended dynamic process. Semiosis in-
volves inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and
events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of making
and taking them.
Pragmatism2, in its original formulation, can be defined as a theory of
meaning.3 At first developed by C. S. Peirce, in the 1870s, in the am-
bience of a series of informal meeting under the guise of the Meta-
                                                          
1 Also: Department of Computer Engineering and Industrial Automation,
FEEC; University of Campinas, Campinas-SP, Brazil.
2   We haved decided to use the more general term ‘pragmatism’, instead of the
more specific, Peircean based term, ‘pragmaticism’, since our discussion includes
‘pragmatic’ philosophers other than Peirce.
3 We write ‘original formulation’ in order to differentiate between the strain of
pragmatism that will be the focus of this inquiry and the more recent strain, often
going by the name of ‘neopragmatism’, among the most notable proponents of
which are Richard Rorty (1979; 1982) and Donald Davidson (1984).
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physical Club at Harvard (see Fisch 1986), the theory is publicly pre-
sented by William James in 1898 (Philosophical Conceptions and
Practical Results), and thereafter formulated by John Dewey and F. C.
S. Schiller. Despite the fact that Peirce continued to refer to pragma-
tism as an ‘old idea’, and include, among its precursors, Socrates, Ar-
istotle, Spinoza, and Kant, John Locke was in fact the first philosopher
to precisely formulate a semiotic (pragmatic) theory of meaning (Waal
2001: 24).
Conceived as strictly a ‘logical principle’, Peirce is against the
transformation of pragmatism into a speculative philosophical attitude
(Hookway 2004). At the same time, Peirce’s pragmatism bears affin-
ity with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a means of clari-
fying philosophical problems — most of which are pseudo-
problems — and of ignoring genuine problems or paradoxes that al-
low for no apparent solution, at least with respect to pragmatism’s
‘logical principles’. As a matter of fact, scholars of pragmatism and
Wittgenstein orientation tend to oscillate between what they consider
‘logical principles’, ‘methods’, and ‘rules’. Their philosophical thrust
is ‘therapeutic’ rather than ‘doctrinaire’, and if the pragmatic philoso-
pher is an architectonic system builder, he nevertheless concedes that
an absolutely final product, complete and free of all inconsistencies,
can hardly be at hand, given (1) the concrete, practical affairs of
pragmatism, and (2) our human fallibilism (Chisholm 1952).
Introduced in 1878 in ‘How to make our ideas clear’, Peirce de-
fines pragmatism as a rule to clarify ideas, concepts, and propositions.
In a latter essay published almost thirty years later in The Nation
(1907), Peirce describes the central core of pragmatism in these con-
ditional terms: ‘The full meaning of a conceptually grounded predicate
implies certain types of events that would likely occur during the
course of experience, according to a certain set of antecedent condi-
tions’ (CSP-MS 318; CP 5.468).4 What, in this vein, is the most ap-
propriate means of introducing pragmatism? In his Harvard Lectures
                                                          
4 Following the scholarly tradition, Peirce’s work will be referred to as CP
(followed by volume and paragraph number for quotes from The Collected Papers
of Charles S. Peirce, Peirce 1866–1913), EP (followed by volume and page num-
ber for quotes from The Essential Peirce, Peirce 1893–1913), MS (followed by
reference number in accordance to Peirce 1967 for quotes from Peirce’s manu-
scripts), and W (followed by volume and page number for quotes from Writings of
Charles S. Peirce, Peirce 1839–1914).
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of 1903 Peirce chose to introduce his philosophical posture through
examples from what he called ‘normative science’. He based the or-
ganization of these examples on the what we will label the concepts of
inter-relatedness and inter-action between signs, the world, and inter-
preters.
Semiosis implies process. In this regard, we follow Rescher in his
definition of a process as “[…] a coordinated group of changes in the
complexion of reality, an organized family of occurrences that are
systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally”
(Rescher 1996: 38). Semiotics entails the project of ‘cutting’ minute
portions of the process and actualizing them as signs for observation,
formal study, analysis, and synthesis. The result, historically, brought
about the spectrum of human intellectual endeavors including mathe-
matics, logic, the physical and biological sciences, the social sciences,
and philosophy and the ‘normative sciences’ (aesthetics, ethics, logic)
(see Parker 1998; Potter 1997). The entire range of these intellectual
semiotic endeavors, as well as the semiotics of everyday life including
feelings, emotions, and concepts, make up the whole of human semi-
otics, carved out of the semiosic continuum.
1. Peirce’s concept of semiotics
Peirce’s concept of Semiotics as the ‘formal science of signs’, and the
pragmatic notion of meaning as the ‘action of signs’ (semiosis), have
had a deep impact in philosophy, psychology, theoretical biology, and
cognitive sciences (see Jakobson 1960; Thom 1975; Prigogine, Sten-
gers 1983; Freeman 1983; Fetzer 1988; 1997; Colapietro 1989; Tier-
celin 1995; Hoffmeyer 1996; Houser et al. 1997; Brunning, Forster
1997; Deacon 1997; Freadman 2004; Hookway 2002; 2004; Misak
2004; Pietarinen 2005; Magnani 2007; Stjernfelt forthcoming). First
and foremost, Peirce’s semiotics is grounded on a list of categories —
Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness — which corresponds to an exhaus-
tive system of hierarchically organized classes of relations (Houser et
al. 1997). This system makes up the formal foundation of his philoso-
phy (Parker 1998) and of his model of semiotic action (Murphey
1993: 303–306).
In brief, the categories can be defined as: (1) Firstness: what is
such as it is, without reference to anything else; (2) Secondness: what
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is such as it is, in relation with something else, but without relation
with any third entity; (3) Thirdness: what is such as it is, insofar as it
is capable of bringing a second entity into relation with a first one in
the same way that it brings itself into relation with the first and the
second entities. Firstness is the category of vagueness, freedom, nov-
elty and originality — ‘firstness is the mode of being which consists in
its subject’s being positively such as it is regardless of anything else.
That can only be a possibility’ (CP 1.25). Secondness is the category
of reaction, opposition, differentiation, existence — ‘generally speak-
ing genuine secondness consists in one thing acting upon another, —
brute action’ […] ‘I consider the idea of any dyadic relation not in-
volving any third as an idea of secondness’ (CP 8.330). Thirdness is
the category of mediation, habit, generality, growth, and conceptuali-
zation or cognition (CP 1.340). In another way of putting the catego-
ries: Firstness is possibility, what might become, Secondness is what is
taken to be what is within some particular context, and Thirdness is
what in all probability would be, given a certain set of conditions (for
further on categories, see Hookway 1985; Murphey 1993; Potter
1997).
1.1. The Peircean sign
Peirce defined semiosis as an irreducible triadic relation between a
Sign, its Object (the object, act or event with which it inter-relates)
and its Interpretant (that which is becoming interpreted through its
inter-action with its interpreter) — we will hereafter refer to this sign
triad as S, O, and I (CP 2.171, CP 2.274). That is, according to Peirce,
any description of semiosis involves a relation constituted by three
irreducibly connected terms, which are its minimal constitutive ele-
ments (MS 318:81; CP 2.242). In Peirce’s words:
My definition of a sign is: A Sign is a Cognizable that, on the one hand, is so
determined (i.e., specialized, bestimmt) by something other than itself, called
its Object, while, on the other hand, it so determines some actual or potential
Mind, the determination whereof I term the Interpretant created by the Sign,
that that Interpreting Mind is therein determined mediately by the Object. (CP
8.177; emphasis in the original)
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Peirce conceives a ‘Sign’ or ‘Representamen’ as a ‘First’ (S) which
stands in a genuine triadic relation with a ‘Second’, called its ‘Object’
(O), which is in the process of ‘determining a Third’, called its ‘Inter-
pretant’ (I), which assumes the same triadic relation with that Object
(CP 2.274). The triadic relation between S, O and I is regarded by
Peirce as irreducible, in the sense that it is not decomposable into any
simpler relation. Thus the term ‘sign’ was used by Peirce to designate
the irreducible triadic process between S, O and I as well as to refer to
the first term of the triad. Some commentators proposed that we
should distinguish between the ‘sign in this strict sense’ and the ‘sign
in a broad sense’ (e.g., Johansen 1993: 62). Signs, conceived in the
broad sense, are never alone. The triadic process of sign making and
sign taking is just that: process.
1.2. The sign process
As Savan (1986: 134) argues, an interpretant is both the third term of a
given triadic relation and the first term (sign) of a subsequent triadic
relation. This is the reason why semiosis cannot be defined as an
isolated triad; it necessarily involves the continuous development of
triads actualized from semiosis (see Merrell 1995). In Savan’s (1987–
1988: 43) words, the terms interpretant, sign and object compose a
triad whose definition can only be circular; each one of the three terms
is defined by the other two. The only properties to be found in S, O
and I are in the functional role; there is no distinct essential or
substantive property, for at any given instant what was an S can become
an O or an I, and the same can be said of O and I (Tienne 1992).
Indeed, one of the most remarkable characteristics of Peirce’s the-
ory of signs is its dynamical nature. The complex (S–O–I) is the focal-
factor of a dynamical process (Hausman 1993: 72). As a truly process
thinker, it was quite natural that Peirce conceived semiosis as basi-
cally a process in which triads are systematically linked to one another
so as to form a web. Sign processes are inter-relatedly extended within
the spatiotemporal dimension, so that something physical has to in-
stantiate or realize them. This means that signs cannot act unless they
are spatiotemporally realized (see Emmeche 2003; Deacon 1999). If a
sign is to have any active mode of being, it must be materially em-
bodied.
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1.3. Meaning and semiosis
Peirce defined meaning as the consequence of triadic inter-relations of
S–O–I as a whole (EP 2:429), as well through differential correlates
among the sign, the object (MS 11, EP 2:274), and the interpretant
(EP 2:496, EP 2:499; CP 4:536) (see Fitzgerald 1966: 84; Bergman
2000). This notion of meaning is derived from his definition of the
sign as a medium for the communication of a form or a habit embod-
ied in the object to the interpretant, so as to determine the interpreter’s
behavior through inter-related inter-action with the sign (see Tienne
2003; Hulswitt 2001; Bergman 2000). Peirce spoke of the sign as a
‘conveyer’, as a ‘medium’ (MS 793), as ‘embodying meaning’.
A Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. [...] As
a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which de-
termines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. [...] That which is
communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form;
that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that
something would happen under certain conditions. (MS 793: 1–3; EP2, p. 544,
n. 22)
In short, for Peirce a sign is both ‘a Medium for the communication of
a Form’ and ‘a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and
to its Interpretant which it determines’. If we consider both definitions
of a sign, we can say that semiosis is a triadic process of communica-
tion of a form from the object to the interpretant by the sign mediation.
1.4. Form communication
Form is defined as having the ‘being of predicate’ (EP 2.544) and it is
also pragmatically formulated as a ‘conditional proposition’ stating
that certain things would happen under specific circumstances (EP
2.388). But for Peirce, form is nothing like a ‘thing’ (Tienne 2003),
but something that is embodied in the object (EP 2.544, n. 22) as a
habit, a ‘rule of action’ (CP 5.397, CP 2.643), a ‘disposition’ (CP
5.495, CP 2.170), a ‘real potential’ (EP 2.388) or, simply, a ‘perma-
nence of some relation’ (CP 1.415).
Form can also be defined as potentiality (‘real potential’, EP
2.388). If we consider this definition, we will also come to the conclu-
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sion that form can show the nature of both firstness and thirdness.
Consider that potentiality is not the same as mere possibility. For the
sake of our argument, consider Peirce’s treatment of Quality as a
‘mere abstract potentiality’ (CP 1.422). It is abstraction not in the
sense of a reduction of complexity to formal simplicity, but in the
sense that the quality in question has been ‘abstracted’ (‘cut’) from the
continuum of possibilities.
Quality, then, has the nature of Firstness, being essentially inde-
terminate and vague. But we can also talk about a generality of Qual-
ity. In this case, we are beyond the domain of pure Firstness, since
generality refers to some law-like tendency. Peirce works in this case
with a merging of Firstness and Thirdness. As an abstract potentiality,
Quality is closer to a blend of Firstness and Thirdness, than to pure
Firstness. Such a treatment seems to be compatible with Peirce’s cate-
gorical scheme, since, as Potter (1997: 94) stresses, the categorical
structure which Peirce uses is ‘highly subtle and complex, admitting
of various combinations’.
For Murphey, there is a transition from the notion of meaning as a
qualitative conception carried by a sign to a relational notion accord-
ing to which the meaning of a concept consists in a ‘law relating op-
erations performed upon the object or conditions of perceptions to
perceived effects’ (Flower, Murphey 1977: 589). The qualitative con-
ception involves reference to the sign’s ground, while the ‘law’ or
necessary conditions of perception are relational rather than qualita-
tive — ‘If the meaning of a concept of an object is to consist in the
conditionals relating operations on the object to perceived effects,
these conditionals will in fact be habits’ (Flower, Murphey 1977:
590).
This brings about a constrained set of effects of the Object on the
interpreter through the mediation of the Sign. In short, Peirce defines a
Sign both as ‘a Medium for the communication of a Form’ and as ‘a
triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpre-
tant which it determines’. If we consider both definitions of a Sign, we
can say that semiosis is a triadic process of communication of a form
from the Object to the Interpretant by the Sign mediation.
João Queiroz, Floyd Merrell44
1.5. The emerging process as form-becoming
Meaning can also be conceived as the emergence of a process involv-
ing S, O and I through mediation of I. It can be seen as a process
working as a constraining factor of possible patterns of interpretative
behaviors. Taking the notion of a form into account, an understanding
of meaning becomes a dynamic, processual inter-action by the inter-
preter of a sign through co-participation between that sign and the in-
terpreter. A possible form emerges through this mutual co-participa-
tion. In this manner a genuine sign without a co-participant is mean-
ingless. Since the sign maker and taker as interpreter emerges out of
co-participation with the sign, the existence of a possible form is em-
bodied in S, O and I, and a habit is intrinsic to the sign and the inter-
preter acting on the sign. This entails a constrained set of effects on
the interpreter that can be fruitfully connected to Rosenthal’s (1994)
pragmatic approach to meaning as an emergent relational pattern of
behavior.5
The form-becoming is the realization of a habit of inter-action em-
bodied in the Object to the interpreter so as to constrain its behavior.
This brings about a constrained set of effects of the Object on the in-
terpreter through the mediation of the Sign.
2. Habit forming
It is well known among Peirce scholars that habit occupies a central
position in Peirce’s pragmatism (for a summary see Almeder 1980;
Hookway 1985). Peirce’s habit entails a disposition to act in a certain
ways under certain circumstances, especially when the carrier of the
habit is stimulated, animated, or guided by certain motives (CP 5.480).
The meaning of a Peircean sign is most adequately understood
through the habits of action, reaction, and thought they provoke, sus-
tain, and modify in the event that the habit carrier wishes to bring
about a change of the customary response to a given sign. When
                                                          
5 The term ‘emergence’ has both an ordinary use, in which people employ the
expression ‘the emergence of x’ just to mean that ‘x has appeared’, and a technical
use. Stephan (1998: 639) writes that ‘in most technical uses, “emergent” denotes a
second order property of certain first order properties (or structures), namely, the
first order properties that are emergent’ (see Queiroz, El-Hani 2006).
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somebody says a diamond is ‘hard’, that person means that a dia-
mond’s nature includes the ability to cut glass and other substances.
That person’s disposition to conceive of a diamond in this way —
rather than simply conceiving it for ornamental purposes — consti-
tutes, pragmatically, what ‘hardness’ means, and ‘diamond’ means in
terms of its characteristics and its nature. In this manner, a sign (tri-
adically) communicates a habit (potentiality, disposition) embodied in
the object to its interpretant. If this person in question had once con-
sidered diamonds strictly in terms of rare gems, and ornamentation,
then the characteristics and nature of diamonds were previously some-
thing other than they now are. Consequently, the meaning of ‘dia-
mond’, and the habit of deriving such meaning, changed when a dia-
mond became a means for qualifying ‘hardness’. This is to say that the
notion of semiosis as form communicated from S to O to I through
mediation allows us to conceive of semiosis, and meaning and mean-
ing change, in a non-substantive, processual way, as a constraining
factor of possible patterns of interpretative behavior through habit and
change of habit.
3. Distinguishing Peirce
from other theories of signs and their meaning
3.1. Frege’s legacy
Classical theories of reference assume a strong connection between a
sign, its meaning, and its reference. Knowing the meaning of a sign is
knowing how it refers. Gottlob Frege simplified this formula (Frege
1970; Dummett 1972). He drew a distinction between ‘sense’ (Sinn)
and ‘reference’ (Bedeutung). ‘Sense’ is grasped when a sign is under-
stood, and this ‘sense’ determines its ‘reference’. Frege is often re-
garded as the prime initiator of ‘logicism’ — the wedding of logic and
mathematics, with the former hopefully becoming the repository of all
thought and the latter the queen of the sciences. According to Frege, if
language could be liberated from vagueness and ambiguity, it could
become a respectable instrument of unequivocal meaning and thought.
In other words, by ‘logicizing’ language, its weaknesses could be
strengthened, its blemishes could be erased, and future mistakes could
be avoided. From the Olympian reaches of the highest rooftops the
world could eventually be seen from a detached God’s-eye view.
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The task Frege set for himself by way of this ‘sense/reference’ dis-
tinction was monumental: to establish a method for determining link-
ages between the objective world and its representation in signs.
Equality of meaning of different signs referring to the same object
became the watchword. The dilemma was that Frege’s grand game
plan involved rendering two virtually incompatible domains virtually
equivalent: language on the one hand, and the furniture of the world
on the other. Frege argued that while two signs with the same ‘refer-
ence’— Venus, for example — could have two senses — the ‘morning
star’ and the ‘evening star’ — two signs with the same sense could not
enjoy the luxury of different ‘reference’. By way of definitions, the
intension (sense) of a sign consists of the conception of the sign, irre-
spective of that to which it refers. Extension (reference) consists of the
things to which that conception refers. Intension used in this context
must be distinguished from intension (of intensionality), a phenome-
nological term entailing the property of consciousness whereby it re-
fers to or intends an object. The intensional object is not necessarily
existent, but can be merely what the mental act is about, whereas ex-
tension presumably involves the ‘real’ furniture of the objective world
(Avni 1990).
Thus, ‘Venus is Venus’ is a tautology. In contrast, ‘That star up
there in the dark expanse is Venus’ is not. It bears reference, exten-
sion. ‘The evening star is Venus’ has both reference and sense, inten-
sion. But ‘The morning star is Venus’ also spots reference and sense.
Reference is one (‘Venus’) but sense is two (‘evening star’, and
‘morning star’). However, Frege assures us that no problem exists
inasmuch as we specify ‘reference’ to objects in the physical world, so
it is still smooth sailing toward clear and distinct thinking and mean-
ing. Apparently the relations between Frege’s signs and the world is
not that of symmetry, but asymmetry. However, this problem was in a
manner of speaking pushed under the rug, for the sign’s intensionality
(sense) was highlighted somewhat at the expense of extensionality
(reference), and language itself, that apparently ubiquitous partner to
mind, held the trump card. Which is what we might have expected,
since Frege stacked the deck from the beginning.
But more questions arise: Do sentences impart any information re-
garding their presumed objects of ‘reference’ (Venus, morning star,
evening star), or simply about the signs themselves (‘Venus’, ‘morn-
ing star’, ‘evening star’)? If the latter is the case, then how comes it
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that we would like to be comforted by the soothing idea that ‘refer-
ence’ is fixed, while meanings may suffer alterations? If meanings
change, how can signs actually ‘refer to’ the same things in the world?
If signs do not necessarily ‘refer to’ the same things but to variable
‘semiotic entities’, then do the ‘real’ things of the world actually make
much difference regarding the engendering of meaning? Can mean-
ings be something found in things ‘referred to’, or are meanings em-
bodied within their respective signs? Or in the final analysis, do words
hook onto world.
3.2. Saussure
The Swiss linguist whose life parallels that of Peirce eschews diach-
rony and develops a tunnel-minded obsession with synchrony. Lan-
guage, at a particular synchronic slice, is conceived to be virtually
immutable; it is for the purpose of analytic practice a bedrock of order
and stability. According to this notion, meaning remains fundamen-
tally the same independently of any and all individual sign users with
specific contexts; language is no slave to the wishes and whims of the
individual; if change there be, it comes about through the linguistic
practices of the entire community. Language is ultimately grounded in
rock-solid objectivity. It must exist outside all individual conscious-
ness in order that there might be communication at all; yet at the same
time it must be ready and available to any and all speakers, who in the
beginning internalized it, and as individuals, are now slaves to lan-
guage, unlike Humpty-Dumpty whose words mean exactly what he
wants them to mean (Saussure 1966).
Language study in terms of a static, autonomous synchronic slice
divorced of the evolutionary history of language carries the implica-
tion that: (1) there is little to no consideration of time, (2) language is
self-sufficient and has no need of the physical world and lines of cor-
respondence between signs and objects, (3) meaning is constructed
exclusively within language, (4) meaning, derived from a signi-
fier/signified binary relationship, is in the brain-mind of the speaker
and hearer, and to the entire speech community to which they belong,
(5) consequently there is no legitimate appreciation of the process of
sign development and evolution of signs (Harris 1987).
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In sum, if we take Saussure at face value, we have hardly more re-
course than to toss time, process, change, history, and the idea of
contextuality, in the trash heap. Understandably, Saussure has come
under attack in recent decades from a variety of views (Derrida 1974;
Harris 2002; Thibault 1996).
3.3. Information theory
The mathematical theory of communication is a branch of mathemat-
ics that arose out of communication theory. As Shannon and Weaver
defined it, ‘[t]he fundamental problem of communication is that of
reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message
selected at another point’ (Shannon, Weaver 1949: 31). According to
Adams (2003: 472), ‘at the foundation of information theory is the
development of methods to measure the amount of information gener-
ated by an event or events, and mathematical treatments of the trans-
mission characteristics of communication channels’. It relies on the
theory of probability to model information sources, flow, and commu-
nication channels. Information is measured in terms of the unexpect-
edness of the sequence of signals, written H =  pi log (1/pi), where pi
is the probability of the ith form of signal.
This theory allows one to define information as the measure of the
probability of selection of a particular message among the set of all
possible messages. The probabilistic measure of information provided
by this theory is non-semantic, indifferent to meaning (Shannon,
Weaver 1949: 31).
A sign is decoded by the emitter and transmitted through a me-
dium, then encoded by the receiver. The medium can be compact and
diffuse air patterns between speaker and listener, black marks on paper
between writer and reader, or electrical impulses between telephone
messages sent and messages received. Francisco Varela calls this the
‘conduit tube’ theory (1979). It is as if the emitter sent signs through a
conduit tube and they are received by the receiver, and, if by some
miracle the receiver takes in an exact replication of those signs,
meaning is preserved. But actually, there virtually no regard for
meaning in information theory. Rather, information theory is based on
the statistical probability of a set of signs creating an intelligible com-
bination, a relatively intelligible combination in spite of some back-
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ground noise, or of the set become a mere scramble, noise. Meaning is
by and large ignored.
3.4. Kripke
Kripke generally follows the ‘causal theory’ of reference according to
which the object ‘causes’ particular mental events that then call up
meaning (Kripke 1972; 1977; 1980). In some way, ‘the referent must
be historically, or, we might say, causally connected to the speech act’
(Donellan 1972: 377). The causal theory explains the power of words
in their referring to objects in terms of causal chains that include the
objects of signs and the speaker’s and hearer’s representations of
them. A singular sign ‘rigidly designates’ a particular object; this
designation is a matter of the appropriate causal links holding between
the object and the sign’s use. This theory ‘seems to promise not only a
unified treatment of the various object-involving phenomena [by way
of knowledge, memory, belief, empirical evidence], but a naturalistic
and possibly even physicalist one as well’ (Stampe 1979: 87).
This is an ‘objectivist-realist’ view (in this regard see Kripke’s
(1982) reaction to Wittgenstein’s skeptical argument). Consequently,
imaginary signs, or fictions, cannot work like objectivist linguistic
constructions. If they did, there would be no knowing whether or not
life is just a dream. But it is not a dream, according to the objectivist-
realist, for the world is real. And this reality is accessible, if we could
just get things right by correctly hooking worlds onto the furniture of
the world. Representation, reference, and meaning, then, are quite le-
gitimate. There is according to this theory definitely a correspondence
between language and objects, acts, and events. The upshot is that
meaning is derived from this dualistic combination of sign and thing.
Context is consequently given little consideration (Hacking 1993).
3.5. Lakoff and Johnson
Understanding entails the world we made, our semiotic world, and the
way we experience it. Such understanding involves body and mind as
a whole, as bodymind, and our capacities and skills, values, moods
and attitudes, within our entire cultural tradition. Meaning as a body-
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mind process is a matter of creating ‘schemes’ as models of knowing
and meaning making (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987). ‘Schemes’ involve
the way we are bound up within a linguistic community, our aesthetic
sensibilities, logical and rational modes of comprehending out world,
and our ethical standards.
Understanding entails, in this manner, and to use the terms of our
argument, our inter-active, inter-relatedness with and from within our
world, our cultural institutions, our linguistic tradition, and our his-
toricized context. It is our concretely sensed world as well as our
world of abstractions. The whole of our contextualized understanding
comes to bear on the meaning we arrive at with respect to each and
every sign (Lakoff, Johnson 1999). We would tend to concur at least
with this aspect of Lakoff and Johnson’s general view of meaning, and
it is by and large commensurate with Peirce’s thought.
4. In capsule form
Table 1 offers a schematic picture of the diverse concepts of meaning
since Frege’s time. A study of the similarities and contrasts among the
capsules making up the scheme leads one to the observation that
solely the Peircean Mode, (1) adequately accounts for semiosic-
semiotic processes in time in terms of past-present-future, (2)
correlates time with three forms of semiosis according to the nature of
the categories, (3) considers differences (a) between the components
of the sign, (b) between signs and other signs, (c) between the
categories, (d) between mind, body and world, and (e) ‘in here’ and
‘out there’ and empirical and non-empirical, as a matter of degree
rather than kind, dynamic potential continuity rather than static
discontinuity, process rather than product, (4) embodies the mind, and
the embodied mind is involved to a greater or lesser degree according
to the sign type and the category or categories in question, and (5)
genuinely includes context dependency of signs, their objects, their
interpretation, and their interpreters — since those interpreters are,
themselves, signs among signs. The five non-Peircean theories
encapsulated in Table 1 account for at least one or more of the five
qualifications, but only Peirce’s concept of the sign and meaning
includes all of them.
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5. On the pragmatic maxim
From 1878 until the end of his life, Peirce made various attempts at es-
tablishing a general principle to account for meaning. He called that
principle the ‘pragmatic maxim’. The maxim is the means for con-
structing the meaning of a sign as a consequence of practical validation
of the sign put in the form of a proposition whose nature is that of: (1) a
conjecture as to the possible meaning of the sign (Firstness), (3) the
conjecture formulated as a hypothesis — what would likely result and
render the possible meaning likely, if certain conditions inhere (Third-
ness), and (2) the hypothesis put to the test in order to ascertain whether
or not the possible meaning is acceptable (Secondness).
Priority is placed on: (1) imagining what might transpire regarding
the sign in question when put within the contexts of other signs, (2)
conceiving of a viable hypothesis that might be the consequence of the
sign’s inter-action within that context, and (3) determining the conse-
quences of such practical inter-action. Experience, or sensibility, is the
chief watchword: ‘Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible ef-
fects’. And the consequence of experience yields a tentative answer to
the problem of meaning: ‘The possible practical consequences of a
concept constitute the sum total of the concept’ (EP 2: 139). For
Hookway (2004: 121), the maxim must prove the consequence of
‘identifying and describing these sensible effects’ of the sign — Peirce
emphasizes this verificationist theme in his pragmatism when he
writes that he only desires
to point out how impossible it is that we have an idea in our minds which re-
lates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything
is our idea of its sensible effects. (W3: 266)
This is to imply that just as signs become other signs in the continuous
semiosic-semiotic process, so also meanings are always becoming
something other than what they were becoming, and this becoming is
the consequence of a set of initial conditions that are acted on by a
potential knower. In Peirce’s words:
In general, we may say that meanings are inexhaustible. We are too apt to
think that what one means to do and the meaning of a word are quite unrelated
meanings of the word ‘meaning’, or that they are only connected by both re-
ferring to some actual operation of the mind. Professor Royce especially in his
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great work The World and the Individual has done much to break up this mis-
take. In truth the only difference is that when a person means to do anything
he is in some state in consequence of which the brute reactions between things
will be moulded [in] to conformity to the form to which the man's mind is it-
self moulded, while the meaning of a word really lies in the way in which it
might, in a proper position in a proposition believed, tend to mould the con-
duct of a person into conformity to that to which it is itself moulded. Not only
will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mould reactions to itself,
but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this
element of the phenomenon or object of thought the element of Thirdness. It is
that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the fu-
ture. (CP 1.343)
5.1. How the maxim works
In Peirce’s first rendition of the maxim in 1878, which is the most
commonly cited, we have the following:
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402; also 5.2, 5.9,
5.18, 5.427, and MS 327)
Notice how a combination of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness is
implied in the maxim. We are asked to consider the practical bearings
of the effects (Secondness) that whatever is under consideration might
conceivably have (Firstness) given certain prevailing conditions
(Thirdness). Then, we will have what we conceive would be result if
the perceived world were of such-and-such a nature, according to what
we imagine might possibly be the case (Nesher 1983).
However, since what emerges out of our imaginative faculties is
not only unpredictable but virtually without definite limits, the nature
of what we would expect will ensue according to the myriad ways our
world would be perceived and conceived would be equally unlimited,
given all possible times and places, here and there and in the past, pre-
sent, and future. The maxim, in this regard, plays on our imagining
what might possibly be the case in one of an unlimited number of
contexts. So there can be no closure, since tomorrow might usher in
some unforeseen possibilities of the imagination or of the perceived
and conceived world that might end in new probabilities (of Third-
ness) of actualization in the world (of Secondness).
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The maxim has to do with the semiotic subject’s construction of
her world. It is a matter of her making what appears to be the case the
case, at least for her at a given space-time juncture. It is a method not
for determining whether a set of signs, characteristically in the form of
a sentence or set of sentences, is timelessly and undeniably ‘true’.
Rather, it is an indeterminately variable method for inter-acting with
signs in such a way that the ‘semiotic world’ with which they inter-
relate appears to be the case. And in the process their meaning
emerges: the maxim enables signs — including the semiotic agents,
ourselves — to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps.
This is to say that the maxim essentially stipulates that the meaning
of a sign regarding what appears to be the case is the product of all
conceivable consequences presented by other sentences — and their
own consequences — engendered from the original sentence. This
product of all conceivable consequences entails the translation of the
initial sign or sentence into a series of conditional sentences the ante-
cedents of each of which prescribe certain interactions between the
interpreter and the signs in question. The consequences, ideally, con-
sist of observable sign phenomena that should or would make them-
selves manifest in the event that the original signs or sentences are
indeed ‘true’.
But ‘truth’, we repeat, is not the specific goal when applying the
pragmatic maxim. The specific task at hand is to draw meaning from
the signs being processed by way of their interactive interrelations.
The interpreter takes the initial signs and creates a hypothetical situa-
tion by imagining what would most likely ensue. Then he puts his hy-
pothetical signs to the test in terms of a thought experiment ‘in here’
or by interacting with the signs’ objects ‘out there’ in order to see if he
was right. If his hypothesis turns out to appear correct for the time
being, the possibility nonetheless remains that other hypotheticals may
at future moments present themselves, compelling her to repeat the
operation. If his initial hypothesis is found deficient, then back to the
drawing board for an alternative hypothetical, in which case she re-
peats the operation. And so on.
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5.2. The maxim is never infallible
We should by no means take the maxim as a method to ‘perfect clear-
ness’, as Peirce’s long-time friend, William James put it (James 1920:
411–412; Potter 1996: 94). The maxim is capable of putting us on the
road toward clarity, but never perfect clarity. Perfect clarity does not
exist for us, since all signs according to Peirce and as we have ob-
served, given their nature as signs, are to a greater or lesser degree
caught up in vagueness, for, fallible as we are, there is always some
degree of uncertainty in our sign interpretations.
What the maxim does is put us on the track toward some future
time when we will hopefully know more than we now know (in other
words, our knowing will hopefully be less vague). It tells us to enter-
tain our imagination that so-and-so might be the case of the object,
act, or event in questions if certain conditions are in place. The object,
act, or event possesses certain characteristics, but at this point they are
no more than that: possibilities (Firstness) as far as our awareness
goes. None of these possibilities has yet become actual (Secondness)
for the sign maker and taker. If and when it is actualized for us, then,
and only then, can we properly conceptualize it as a sign (interpretant,
Thirdness). In the sense of the futurity of the maxim, then, we have
the possibility that, along with our imaginary conception of the matter
at hand, we should by the maxim be able to get an idea in terms of
what most likely would happen in the event that certain circumstances
would be actualized.
In the final analysis, a Peircean meaning of the sign is not a thing
or an entity. It is an emergent process resulting from the inter-action
between S–O–I within particular contexts. This is to say that a sign’s
meaning emerges through realizing the consequences of certain inter-
action between the sign and other signs brought about by the seeker of
that sign’s meaning. In this manner, it cannot be said that meaning is
in the sign, in some talking and thinking head, in the referent of the
sign, or in the medium by which the sign is transported to its potential
receiver and interpreter. This point was very emphatically made by
Hilary Putnam (1975; 1988).
But that is not all. Just as a given interpreter has acquired habits of
feeling and sensing and thought within a social context that includes
the community to which the interpreter belongs, so also meaning is by
no means exclusively an individual affair. Anybody who interprets a
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sign bring the baggage of the entire life of the social conventions by
means of which he learned what he knows through habituation of his
social practices. This includes past experiences and present experi-
ences that collaborate to create expectations regarding what the future
holds in store. Sign meaning, then, also integrates other signs and their
own interpreters — since any and all interpreters are signs among
signs. It includes the entire community of semiotic agents.
The focus, then rests chiefly on the interpretant (I) of the sign. In
principle, it could imply an infinite regress were it not for the inter-
preter putting a stop to the process by ‘cutting’ out an I that, in col-
laboration with S and O that had previously been ‘cut’ out, produces
an effect on the interpreter himself. When the interpreter has inter-
acted with the S, O and I, as a result of this effect, he then creates an-
other S. This I includes the original sign’s meaning, which has become
in essence another sign ‘cut’ from the continuum within this altered
context of the interpreter, now having constructed the original sign’s
interpretation. Since every context of an emergent sign is compara-
ble — but never identical — to past contexts, the sign’s interpretation
creates a new context in the virtually immediate future, and hence the
S becomes something other than what it was in the process of becom-
ing, and so also the O, both of which call for mediation by a poten-
tially different I. And the triadic process begins anew. In this manner
it can be said that Peircean signs are self-correcting (see Ransdell
1977: 162).
6.1. Meaning in the making within a human context —
meaning as form becoming
As an illustration of meaning change within altering contexts that give
rise to the emergence of signs becoming other signs, consider the case
of the term ‘atom’. ‘Atoms’ were according to the Greek Democritus
minuscule ‘solid, indivible spheres’. This is spacetime slice1 out of the
continuum of semiosic possibilities. During John Dalton’s days at the
beginning stages of the scientific revolution, when ‘atoms’ of one sub-
stance were conceived to combine with ‘atoms’ of another substance
to form conglomerates or ‘molecules’, ‘atoms’ were conceived as
solid spheres with minute ‘hooks’ that could attach one ‘atom’ with
another ‘atom’ to form a new substance. This is spacetime slice2.
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During the later half of the nineteenth century under the influence of
Maxwell-Faraday ‘field theory’, ‘atoms’ were conceived as micro-
scopic  spatial ‘vortices’: spacetime slice3. After John Rutherford dis-
covered in the early years of the twentieth century that ‘atoms’ actu-
ally consisted of collections of ‘subatomic’ entities, he created the
visual image of an ‘atom’ as akin to a plum pudding, with the ‘suba-
tomic’ entities embedded in the ‘atomic’ medium: spacetime slice4.
Shortly thereafter, Niels Bohr created the picture of an ‘atom’ as a
‘nucleus’ surrounded by gyrating ‘subatomic’ entities, somewhat like
a tiny solar system. An ‘atom’ is in this sense largely ‘vacuous’:
spacetime slice5. In the 1920s Werner Heisenberg proposed that an
‘atom’ is describable as an abstract mathematical ‘matrix’, thus doing
away with picture theories altogether: spacetime slice6. A short time
later, the de Broglie-Schrödinger interpretation had it that an ‘atom’ is
a ‘wave amplitude’. It becomes substantive only after inter-action with
some co-participant entity, which could be the observer through his
detecting instrument. In this interpretation, an ‘atom’ is picturable, if
at all, as a hazy cloud of possibilities: spacetime slice.
What, then, is the meaning of ‘atom’? If we consider each space-
time slice as a ‘world’ in and of itself, then each ‘world’ is a static
increment followed by a successive and equally static ‘world’. This is
the equivalent of McTaggart’s (McTaggart, McTaggart 1927) atempo-
ral B-series. There is a ‘world’ before, and a ‘world’ after. But there is
no flow of time. There is no temporal present sliding along the knife
edge of time becoming something other than what it was becoming in
the past and becoming something that will have been becoming in the
future. This temporality would be McTaggart’s A-series. A Saussurean
conception would be akin to the B-series. Kripke’s ‘causal’ theory of
meaning also ignores process, as does information theory, that focuses
on decoding and recoding messages that remain intact when trans-
ferred through the sign medium. Frege’s concept of meaning renders
an account of different interpretations, through time, of sense regard-
ing the same reference, but it does not account for any change of ref-
erence as it is conceived within varying contexts. Only the Peircean
processual approach to the sign adequately includes the equivalent of
McTaggart’s A-series time.
Peircean meaning, in the final analysis, is indeterminately variable.
It is a triadic, context-sensitive, interpreter-dependent, materially ex-
tended and embodied dynamic process. As such, it involves inter-
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relatedness and inter-action between signs, their objects, acts and
events in the world, and the semiotic agents who are in the process of
making and taking them.
6.2. Implications of the Peircean theory of meaning
Peirce’s theory, outlined in this essay, is of the nature of processual
becoming, from possibility (Firstness) to actuality (Secondness) to
potentiality (Thirdness in mediation with Firstness and Secondness) as
one of the indeterminate number of possibilities, any of which could
have been actualized in place of what was selected for actualization).
In this sense, account is given of genuine triadic semiosis. Semiosis
includes not merely signs of intellection (thought-signs) but also signs
of feeling, and inter-related inter-action (bodymind-signs). In this re-
spect, Lakoff and Johnson warrant a favorable nod.
But there is more to this story. It bears on the notion that whatever
logic there may be, it cannot be other than multi-valued. And above
all, as illustrated in the previous paragraphs, it must include time. The
notion of meaning must be non-linearly applied, and change must be
allowed. What is meaningful in one spacetime slice can become
meaningless in another one, and what is meaningful within one space-
time slice can have emerged from what was meaningful within a pre-
vious spacetime slice but has become meaningless within the present
spacetime slice. Hence the notion of becoming is all-important. What
is becoming does so in the process of present becoming, which was
past becoming and will have been future becoming. ‘Atoms’ as ‘solid
spheres’ eventually became ‘atoms’ as ‘largely vacuous’, and those in
their own turn became ‘cloud-like wave amplitudes’. The concept of
becoming is imperative, because all that is semiosis, is flux.
6.3. Peirce, and the others
Peirce’s view of meaning complements Putnam’s (1975; 1981; 1988).
Putnam refuses to compromise on his reservations regarding tradi-
tional theories of meaning. He emphasizes time and time again that
there is no ‘God’s-eye view’ of the world. There is no omniscient
grasp of the whole context within which meaning emerges, in all its
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possible ramifications. The world is simply too rich for the poverty of
our interpretive capacity. Consequently: (1) Meaning is neither in any
correspondence between a sign and its reference, nor is it the case that
meaning or sense (Sinn) determines reference (Bedeutung) (contra
Frege); (2) Meaning is neither in the brain-mind as an autonomous
organism, nor is it in a synchronic slice of language as an autono-
mous entity (contra Saussure); (3) Meaning is not in the referent that
‘causes’ stimulation within the brain-mind evoking a certain response
to a sign (contra Kripke); (4) Meaning is in the entirety of contextual-
ized bodymind inter-action, but it is not in the solicitation of relatively
static schemes (contra Lakoff and Johnson).
The Peircean notion of meaning, in short, can be described as a
matter of form-becoming emerging from S to O and from S to I
through mediation. This allows us to conceive meaning as a non-
substantive, co-participatory fluctuating and flowing processual man-
ner. Meaning as form-becoming is an emergent inter-active, inter-
relational pattern of behavior.
Conclusion
Thus:
(1) the meaning of a sign depends upon comparable past contexts of
what is taken to be the same sign, in the present context, and in imag-
ined, conjectured, or hypothetical future contexts; sign meaning is a
time-bound process;
(2) meaning bears on regularity of inter-related inter-action in the
form of general modes of behavior guided by habit;
(3) meaning entails a process of imagination, consideration of possible
consequences, and inter-action with particular aspects of the physical
world — or mental worlds in terms of purely ‘thought-signs’ — in this
sense it is most fundamental to Peirce’s ‘realist’ philosophy;6
(4) just as for Peirce it is impossible to think without signs, so also
thought itself is impossible without the material incorporation of some
                                                          
6 It bears mentioning that Peirce labels his philosophical posture ‘objective
idealism’. ‘Idealism’ in view of the input of imagination as described above, and
‘objective’ in terms of the sign’s, interpretant’s and interpreter’s inter-action with
the object and the object reciprocally with them.
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aspect of the world, and meaning is impossible without co-
participation of S, O, and I (CP 1.538, 2.253, 5.265, 5.314, 5.470).
When applying this general semiotic approach to biological and
social systems, meaning will most often be an interpreter-dependent
objective process. It cannot be dissociated from the notion of a situ-
ated (and actively distributed) communicational agent (potential or
effective). It is both interpreter-dependent and objective because in-
formation triadically connects S, O, and an effect (I) on the interpreter.
In sum, according to Peirce’s pragmatic model, semiosis, is a tri-
adic, dynamic, context-dependent (situated), interpreter-dependent
(dialogic), materially extended (embodied) dynamic process. It is a
social-cognitive process, not merely a static, symbolic system. It em-
phasizes process rather than product, development rather than finality.
Peirce’s emphasis rests not on content, essence, or substance, but,
more properly, on dynamics inter-relations.
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Семиозис и прагматизм: к динамическому понятию значения
Философы и представители социальных наук различных ориентаций
сошлись во мнении о том,  что прагматика семиозиса подходит для
динамического описания значения как процесса. Семиозис как
центральное понятие прагматической философии Чарльза Сандерса
Пирса может стать ключом к давним проблемам, связанным со зна-
чением. Действительно, идеи Пирса можно считать плодотворными,
если их поместить в рамки когнитивных наук (особенно в связи с его
понятием знака). Согласно пирсовской прагматической модели
семиозис является триадическим, связанным со временем, чувстви-
тельным к контексту, зависимым от интерпретатора, материально
протяженным динамическим процессом. Семиозис привносит
взаимозависимость и взаимодействие между знаками, их объектами,
действиями и событиями, происходящими в мире, и семиотическими
агентами, которые являются их отправителями и получателями.
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Semioos ja pragmatism: Tähenduse dünaamilise mõiste suunas
Erineva orientatsiooniga filosoofid ja sotsiaalteadlased on esile toonud, et
semioosi pragmaatika on kohane kirjeldamaks dünaamiliselt tähendust kui
protsessi. Semioos kui C. S. Peirce’i pragmaatilise filosoofia kese võib
olla võtmeks tähendusega seotud kauastele probleemidele. Tõepoolest,
Peirce’i ideid tuleb pidada viljakaiks, kui need paigutada kognitiivteadus-
tesse, eriti seoses tema märgi mõistega. Peirce’i pragmaatilise mudeli
kohaselt on semioos triaadne, ajaseoseline, kontekstitundlik, interpretee-
rijast sõltuv, materiaalse ulatuvusega dünaamiline protsess. Semioos toob
kaasa vastastikuse suhestatuse ja vastastikuse toime märkide, nende ob-
jektide, tegude ja sündmuste ning semiootiliste toimijate vahel, kes on
nende allikaks ja vastuvõtjaks.
